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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
DAVID MIGUEL GEDO, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20050086-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied the Motion to 
Dismiss/Suppress filed by the Defendant which argued that there had 
been an unlawful search of the vehicle for a VIN number and also that 
an unlawful seizure of the vehicle had occurred. This question is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness, State v. Harmon, 910 
P.2dll96, 1199 (UT 1995). 
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2. Whether the trial court erred when it denied the Motion to 
Dismiss/Suppress filed by the Defendant which argued that the 
Appellant acted in the defense of his property when he acted. This 
question is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness, State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (UT 1995). 
3. Whether the trial court erred when denied defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss on the basis of selective prosecution. Defendant avers that the 
established the burden of a prima facie case of selective prosecution, 
which, when established, would shift the burden of disproving the claim 
to the city. However, the court did not find that a prima facie case had 
been met, and did not require the city to disprove the claim, but merely 
denied the motion. While this question could be a mixed question of law 
and fact, as the facts relate to the sufficiency of the prima facie case, 
whether the trial court correctly applied the law is a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 
(UT 1995). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Miguel David Gedo appeals from the judgment, sentence and 
commitment of the Fourth District Court after being convicted by a jury of 
Disorderly Conduct, an Infraction, and Resisting or Interfering with an Officer 
in the Discharge of Duty, a Class B Misdemeanor and Reckless Driving, a 
Class B Misdemeanor. Miguel David Gedo's Co-Defendant in his matter is 
James Luis Gedo, his brother, who is filing a concurrent appeal in this matter in 
Case Number 20050087-CA. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Miguel David Gedo was charged by information filed in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court alleging that on or about March 5, 2003 he had 
committed the offense of Disorderly Conduct, a Class C Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Section 76-9-102(1 )(b); Utah Code Annotated, and Interference 
with Arresting Officer, a Class B misdemeanor, a violation of Section 76-8-
305, Utah Code Annotated, Criminal Mischief, a Class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Section 76-6-106, and Reckless Driving, a Class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Section 41-6-45. 
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On March 31, 2003, the Defendant appeared for arraignment 
before Judge Guy R. Burningham. On November 10, 2004, Defendant, 
through counsel, submitted a written Motion to Dismiss/Suppress. This 
Motion to Dismiss/Suppress essentially made two arguments: that the 
defendant's property was illegally seized in violation of the fourth amendment 
and that he was entitled to a claim of defense on the basis of justification of 
force and defense of property; and that there had been a violation of Due 
Process due to Selective Prosecution. A memorandum in opposition was filed 
November 29, 2004, and on December 4, 2004 a Motion to Dismiss/Suppress 
was heard by Judge Samuel McVey. The Court denied the motion on that day, 
entering his findings on the record. 
The matter proceeded to trial, and the cases of both the Defendant James 
Gedo and Miguel David Gedo were combined at their request, so that they 
could sit together at counsel table. 
Jury trial was then held December 8 and 9, 2004 in front of Judge 
McVey. At the trial defendant was found Not Guilty of Criminal Mischief, a 
Class B Misdemeanor; Guilty of Disorderly Conduct as an Infraction (he was 
found Not Guilty of the Class C Misdemeanor); Guilty of Interference with an 
Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Guilty of Reckless Driving, a 
Class B Misdemeanor. 
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On January 20, 2005 the Defendant was sentenced to statutory 
maximums on both Class B misdemeanors, with 17 days imposed for the 
Interference Charge to be served as straight time, and 4 days imposed 
consecutive for the Reckless Driving charge with work diversion, and the 
remainder stayed. Defendant served this sentence and is not currently 
incarcerated. 
On January 25, 2005, a timely appeal was filed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The circumstances surrounding the incident leading to the charges 
against the Defendant are as follows: On March 5, 2002, Defendant James 
Gedo and his co-defendant, and brother, Miguel David Gedo, were at their 
home located at 1741 North 450 West, Provo, Utah. On that same date, Provo 
City Parking Cadet Linda Trotter noticed a red and gray GMC Suburban with a 
Utah license plate, 148ZRG with a registration display showing the plate 
expired 01/00. 
Cadet Trotter testified that she determined to write a ticket for this 
offense, (even though Section 41-1 a-1303 makes only driving a vehicle which 
is not properly registered an offense, not parking)(p. 19 12/2/04 transcript). 
She testified that as she entered the plate information into her computer to 
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write a ticket for this infraction, information came back from her accounting 
department that the vehicle (from the license plate search) had four or more 
unpaid parking tickets, and determined to tow the vehicle (p.21 12/2/04 
transcript). 
Cadet Trotter stated that she then contacted dispatch and had dispatch 
run the plate. She further testified that she had already called for a tow truck, 
but while waiting for the tow truck, dispatch informed her that as far as the 
"registration was concerned it came back to a different car," (p. 22 12/2/04 
transcript). 
Cadet Trotter stated that she wished to do a VIN search but that the VIN 
on the dash was covered with debris and the doors were locked. She stated she 
crawled under the vehicle on both sides but could not observe one under the 
vehicle. She also testified that while waiting for the tow truck driver to arrive 
she was parked adjacent to the vehicle (p.22 12/4/04 transcript). 
Cadet Trotter testified that when the tow truck driver arrived she asked 
him to open the door so that she could access the VIN number (p.22 12/4/04 
transcript). He did open the door and Cadet Trotter obtained the VIN number 
which registered to a Kenneth Parker of American Fork, Utah (proffer of 
Trotter's testimony, (p. 6 12/4/04 transcript) 
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This VIN number was registered to a different plate, Utah 741JHE 
which had been sold by the Parkers in 1999, (p. 7 12/4/04 transcript). 
Therefore, the license plate with the parking tickets belonged to a different 
vehicle. However, Cadet Trotter nevertheless instructed the tow truck driver to 
impound the vehicle on the basis of the unpaid parking tickets (p. 22-36, 38 of 
Trotter's testimony 12/4/04 transcript), even though dispatch had informed her 
than these tickets were associated with a different registration for a different 
vehicle. Also, on page 31 of the 12/2/04 transcript, Cadet Trotter testified that 
the vehicle the license plate was registered to "wasn't even a Suburban." (The 
Gedos had recently, in the last several months, purchased the vehicle. This 
information comes from a proffer of testimony (p. 7 12/4/04 transcript). 
Trotter testified that after instructing the tow truck driver to hook up the 
vehicle, she moved her own vehicle and parked on the other side of the street, 
some distance away, while the tow truck officer began to hook up the vehicle 
to tow it. She testified that she would not have been seen, and in fact when she 
noticed a male individual exit the house and begin to appear to argue with the 
tow truck driver, it did not appear that this person was aware of her presence, 
(p. 22-36). 
The tow truck driver began to place his lift under the Suburban in order 
to tow it (p.23). As this occurred, one of the brothers became aware of the tow 
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truck driver's attempt to tow the vehicle. He then approached and made a 
statement to the effect of, "you're not going to steal my car...." (p. 37 Trotter's 
testimony 12/4/04 transcript) which Cadet Trotter testified that she heard. 
That individual then reentered the house and both the individuals exited. 
Testimony was presented that Miguel Gedo entered the vehicle and attempted 
to start it. It did not start and apparently was not running. At this point, Cadet 
Trotter, who had been parked on the other side of the street and away from the 
tow truck driver, felt that the tow truck driver needed assistance and drove up 
to the Suburban, where Miguel Gedo was seated in the driver's side, parallel to 
it and in front of the Gedo Suburban. She testified that he opened his car door 
into her jeep with such force and violence that he created a dent and three deep 
scratches to her vehicle. 
Miguel's testimony was that he opened the door because her vehicle was 
so close to his as he was exiting his vehicle that he needed to do so to protect 
his leg, and that his car door struck her mirror, not the door panel. Other 
evidence presented at trial was not consistent with the cadet's testimony 
regarding damage, and the jury was allowed the opportunity to exit the 
courtroom and actually view the "damage," which appeared to be three faint 
scratches in the clear coat, not the paint of the vehicle, more consistent with 
scratches obtained from a car wash. It had been Cadet Trotter's testimony that 
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she had just before this incident left the car wash at Brent Brown Chevrolet. 
Another witness testified that this car wash had received many complaints for 
this same type of damage. Miguel Gedo was found not guilty at trial for the 
charge of Criminal Mischief, for which this incident was the basis of that 
charge. 
Continuing with the parking cadet's testimony, Miguel Gedo then was 
able to start the vehicle with the assistance of his brother, and the vehicle was 
driven off of the tow truck lift, and parked in the Gedo's driveway. Both 
Gedos testified that after exiting the vehicle Miguel Gedo thereupon went to 
the front of the vehicle, where the hood had already been placed up by James 
Gedo, and began working on the engine while James Gedo then entered the 
vehicle. Miguel Gedo started the vehicle, while James Gedo drove it off of the 
tow truck lift by backing the vehicle up, almost on the vehicle parked behind 
the Suburban, which also belonged to the Gedos, and drove it off onto the curb 
and into the Gedo driveway, in their belief that the vehicle could not be taken 
once on private property. 
Cadet Trotter then testified that she drove into the driveway, parking 
behind the Suburban with her jeep in an effort to prevent the Suburban from 
being driven away. She testified that James Gedo approached her vehicle, and 
screamed at her. Cadet Trotter called for backup and shortly thereafter several 
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police vehicles arrived. Various testimonies was elicited from officers who 
testified that both brothers had separately and in different directions left the 
property, and were shortly located by different officers. Officers testified that 
they demanded the Defendants to stop, raise their hands and get down on the 
ground. 
This testimony was disputed by the Gedos who testified that they did not 
disobey the officers' commands. They were thereupon taken into custody and 
charged by Information alleging the offenses previously set out. 
At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss/Suppress, with respect to the 
issues raised regarding Defendant's allegation that the unlawful seizure of the 
vehicle justified Defendant's actions in defending his property, Defendant 
objected to the search of the vehicle for the VIN number, arguing that it was an 
unlawful search inasmuch as it was made without a warrant. Those arguments 
were set out in his memorandum, and made on the record at the December 2, 
2004 hearing. 
At that same hearing defendants made a defense of property argument in 
that in accordance with Section 76-2-401 and 76-20406 of the Utah Code, 
"conduct which is justified [is] a defense to prosecution for any offense based 
upon that conduct," and that "the defense that they used force to the extent that 
they reasonably believed that force was necessary to prevent or terminate 
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criminal interference with real property which was lawfully in their 
possession," in that they believed that the city and the tow company were not 
justified in removing that vehicle under the terms that they removed it," p. 57 
12/2/04 transcript). 
Also, included in this memorandum were Appellant's arguments that the 
charges against him should be dismissed due to the selective prosecution by 
Provo City. In support of his argument, he made the following allegations 
which were set out in his memorandum, p. 3-5: 
Both the Defendants James Luis Gedo and his co-defendant, 
Miguel David Gedo, have had numerous cases against them 
dismissed, some of those are set out below; however, this list is 
not all inclusive: 
a. Case No. 021401302, Orem City v. James Gedo, Motion to 
Suppress granted (unlawful search and seizure); 
b. Case No. 011200837, Lindon City v. James Luis Gedo, 
Defendant's motion to suppress is granted (unlawful stop, 
search and seizure); 
c. Case 031403408, Orem City v. James Gedo, Defendant's 
motion to suppress is granted (unlawful stop and seizure); 
d. Case No. 005409725, Pleasant Grove City v. David Gedo, The 
Defendant had appealed convictions for infractions in Justice 
Court, and upon the matter being appealed to District Court the 
prosecution unlawfully amended the charges to Class B 
misdemeanors for which the defendant was convicted at jury 
trial. This case was subsequently dismissed on Defendant's 
motion of due process violation. 
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e. Case No. 031401937, Provo City v. David Gedo, Defendant's 
motion to dismiss granted; 
f. Case 03540556, Provo City v. David Gedo, dismissed when 
police witness fails to appear at trial; 
g. Case No. 035411185, Provo City v. David Gedo, dismissed 
when police witness fails to appear at trial; 
h. Case No. 035418519, Orem City v. Miguel David Gedo, 
dismissed by motion of prosecution; 
i. Case No. 011200023, Orem City v. James Gedo, Defendant's 
motion to dismiss granted; 
j . Case No. 011200075, Orem City v. James Gedo, Defendant's 
motion to dismiss granted; 
k. Case No. 021401705, Orem City v. James Gedo, motion to 
dismiss by prosecution; 
1. Case No. 021401704, Orem City v. James Gedo, motion to 
dismiss by prosecution; 
m. Case No. 021401301, Orem City v. James Gedo, motion to 
dismiss by prosecution; 
At the hearing held December 2, 2004, in argument and testimony 
proffered by counsel, it was stated that the Appellant and his brother (12/2/04 
hearing, p. 60): 
"are Hispanic males and so they are a member of a 
protected class. And they both have been subjected to numerous 
and repeated criminal charges by the police to the point that they 
both believe that they are subjects of harassment. They've been 
told on numerous occasions by police officers that they should 
leave the state or asked why they had not left yet. In fact, I myself 
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was asked by a lieutenant with the Provo City police why my , my 
clients did not just leave the state and why they hadn't left yet. 
They are frequently stopped and questioned even when no 
charges are made. 
As part of my initial preparation for the defense of these 
clients I requested discovery related to any charge that they'd ever 
been charged with or any police reports because they believe that 
they have been subject to harassment. The court with Judge 
Burningham had limited that discovery request to the last five 
years and so that's all I had, I didn't have previous. But with that 
last five years I made a graph and a, we've used it for illustrative. 
I don't have it with me but I could present it to the court. But we 
had about 50 different cases where we actually had an incident 
number. There were more, that's many more where they're, 
where my clients remember being stopped but there was never an 
incident number made, never a police report made, and no charges 
being made but they still feel they were being harassed with the 
stops, they were questioned, you know, in manner which a, which 
just continues to frighten especially my client James Gedo... 
Many, of those charges, or many occasions where they have 
been stopped or actually there's been a police report often no 
charges were filed because they're , they're simply not substantive 
or the prosecution themselves does the screening decides not to 
file the charges, maybe on not constitutional grounds. But even 
then even when they have been prosecuted by the local agencies 
often they have been dismissed. And I've provided in my motion 
a list of, of many cases, it doesn't even include all the cases, 
where charges have been dismissed. 
At this hearing, counsel for the Defendant argued that the 
prosecution's response to this argument insufficiently responded to the 
argument that a prima facie case of selective prosecution had been made, 
when the prosecution in essence argued that there are many cases that they 
have been successfully prosecuted. Counsel for Appellant stated: 
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Well that's that's not true. There is a trespassing charge in 
1995 a Class C misdemeanor that James Gedo was convicted of, 
and then several months ago James Gedo was convicted with 
interference with a police officer a, but the a, resist, the assault on 
a police officer was dismissed. Really it's just very, very rare that 
they have actually been convicted of a crime (12/2/04 hearing, p. 
62). 
While many of the arguments raised in the motion for selective 
prosecution related to this Appellant's brother and Co-Appellant, James Gedo, 
the motion was made jointly on both their behalves. Further, although 
testimony was given that while Cadet Trotter herself had no previous contact 
with the Defendants, the Appellant argued at the hearing that it was later, when 
multiple other officers arrived, the estimate given as many as twenty officers, 
who did have previous knowledge of and contact with the Defendants, (p.73 of 
12/2/04 hearing transcript) when the situation escalated further and the 
Defendants were charged with the crimes they were charged with. Cadet 
Trotter never cited the Defendants for any offense, even expired registration or 
unpaid parking tickets, which were the basis given for the impoundment. 
Also, on page 14 of the transcript from the 12/2/04 hearing, counsel for 
the Appellant proffered testimony that within a month after this incident, Provo 
City instructed a towing company to remove some 15 vehicles from the 
property, which were not parked on the street, but which were parked on the 
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property. Provo City never proceeded through a zoning violation, but 
impounded the vehicles by stating they were abandoned. During this incident 
the Gedos exited their home and insisted the vehicles were their own, though 
not registered in their names, and were not abandoned. Gedos filed a Notice of 
Claim with the City, but received no response. The Defendant alleges this 
action is also part of the ongoing harassment of his family and himself by 
Provo City and other neighboring cities. On page 16, counsel also argues 
Defendant's position that these efforts on "ongoing efforts by the police to 
make their life uncomfortable." 
Appellant believes that the arguments raised in their motion were 
sufficient to show a prima facie case of selective prosecution, which must then 
be refuted by the prosecution, the burden shifting to them to show that that 
there has not been selective prosecution. 
Provo City was not required to disprove the charge. While 
they did respond to the Defendant's motion, they made only a 
fleeting response to the allegation, stating, "he has not shown how 
his race or religion in any way comes to play in this case," and 
that the "reason the defendant has been 'subjected to numerous 
and repeated criminal charges' is because he has repeatedly been 
involved in or perpetrated actions in violation of the law. In an 
attempt to make out a prima facie case of selective prosecution, 
the defendant cites a list of cases against him that have been 
dismissed. However, there are a large number of cases that have 
been successfully prosecuted. If the defendant continues to break 
the law, the City will continue to prosecute him," (p. 9 Provo 
City's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss/Suppress). 
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The Court denied this motion, (12/2/04 hearing, p. 71-79) finding that 
while it could be argued that the Defendants were members of a protected 
class, that he didn't believe that it had been shown that the prosecutions were 
based on race or that this racial category was singled out, stating: 
There [wasn't] was any evidence that this particular class of 
individual was, you know, that this racial category of individual 
was singled out by either Officer Trotter or by the other police 
who showed up I guess to keep the peace...I just don't see it 
here." 
The Court seemed to require the defense show a prima facie case 
that there was discrimination against Latinos in general, rather than 
simply show that the Defendants themselves were members of a 
protected class and had been themselves selectively discriminated 
against or prosecuted, when he stated, "there's no evidence of overall 
discrimination against latinos by the Provo City police," (12/2/04 
hearing, p. 79). 
The matter proceeded to trial, and the cases of both the Defendant James 
Gedo and Miguel David Gedo were combined at their request, so that they 
could sit together at counsel table. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant objects to the search of the vehicle, for a VIN number 
inasmuch as it was made without a warrant or probable caused based on 
exigent circumstances, and further objects to the seizure of his vehicle, when it 
was seized for unpaid parking tickets even when the parking cadet testified that 
she realized that the parking tickets were issued to the license plate on the 
vehicle which was actually registered to a different vehicle. 
Defendant is guaranteed freedoms from unreasonable searches and 
seizures pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah and the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
Further, Defendant was justified in protecting his property when he acted to 
attempt to keep the property from being seized. Lastly, Appellant argues that 
he has been unlawfully selectively prosecuted and that the lower Court should 
have found that a prima facie case of selectively prosecution had been shown, 
thus shifting the burden to the City to prove that it did not. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE AND SEARCH OF VEHICLE FOR VIN NUMBER 
Defendant objects to the search of the vehicle, arguing that it was an 
unlawful search inasmuch as it was made without a warrant. Defendant is 
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guaranteed freedoms from unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Such search and resultant 
seizure of evidence are therefore per se invalid, see Camara v. Municipal Ct. 
387 U.S. 523 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Cadv v. 
Dombrowsky 413 U.S. 433 (1973); and State v. Arroyo, 797 P.2d 684 (Utah, 
1990). 
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a constitutionally 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement to substantiate such seizure, 
search and/or arrest. The issue before us is whether, the parking cadet had the 
authorization to impound the vehicle and to search the vehicle (which may 
have led to her further cause for impoundment rather than simply issue a 
citation for expired registration as had been her initial intent). 
Further, neither Defendants were charged with any crime in relation to 
the vehicle, not expired or invalid registration, unpaid parking tickets, or any 
other vehicle related charge, even though they were present and claiming 
ownership of the vehicle. 
Section 41-6-102 of the Utah Code Annotated, sets out specific 
requirements regarding the removal and impoundment of vehicles. This 
section refers to other sections when impoundment can occur, i.e., section 41-
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la-1101, which sets out when a peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and 
take possession of any vehicle. None of those listed meet the circumstances 
herein. There is not an authorization for impoundment for unpaid parking 
tickets, according to the Utah Code Annotated, there is; however, language for 
seizure when the officer finds that registration has been expired for more than 
three months, or was never properly registered by the owner, as occurred here, 
but that statute requires also that the vehicle "is being operated on a highway," 
41-la-l 101(1). [emphasis added.] This vehicle was parked. It was not being 
operated. Further, neither Defendants James nor David Gedo were ever cited 
with any violation which allows for seizure of a vehicle according to this 
section 41-6-102. 
Therefore there is no legal justification for the seizure of the Defendants' 
vehicle. Further, it was this unlawful seizure which then led to the charges 
which the Defendants are now being charged with. An argument can be made 
that this unlawful seizure led to the charges, that the evidence of subsequent 
criminality of the Appellant's actions were the fruit of the poisonous tree, as it 
comes as a direct result of the unlawful seizure. Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d441 (1963). 
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POINT II 
DEFENSE AND JUSTIFICATION OF FORCE IN DEFENSE OF 
PROPERTY 
Appellant claims the defense and the justification of force and defense of 
property in accordance with Section 76-2-401 and 76-2-406 of Utah Code 
Annotated. Section 76-2-401 states that conduct which is justified as a defense 
to prosecution for any offense based on the conduct. The Appellant claims the 
defense of justification in that he and his brother used force against another 
when and to the extent they reasonably believed that force was necessary to 
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property which was 
lawfully in his possession or the possession of his immediate family, or 
belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect, Section 
76-2-406. 
Defendants have several vehicles in their possession at any time, 
sometimes the vehicles are their own property, and at other times the vehicles 
are being worked on by them on the behalf of others. In this particular 
circumstance, Defendants had an interest in the property and a right and duty to 
protect it. Therefore their conduct is a defense to the charge. 
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This issue was raised in Appellant's Motion to Dismiss/Suppress and 
argued at the December 2, 2004 hearing. 
At that hearing, Judge McVey ruled that while the defendants would 
have been upset by seeing their vehicle being towed away, there was a remedy 
short of engaging force of self defense, in that "there are hearings authorized in 
the statute, the city has provided a means of due process in their ordinance by 
which the vehicle can be obtained back under the conditions set forth by the 
city...whether the city followed state procedures...." Is not "really relevant in 
this case so much as the fact that the city had provided due process to anyone 
whose vehicle is towed and, therefore ... if the vehicle is towed and there is 
some justification for it that is lawful." The lower court found that "the 
defendants are not justified in using force if in fact it turns out they used force 
to defend their property in that situation," p. 70 12/2/04 transcript). 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS BEEN SELECTIVELY PROSECUTED IN VIOLATION 
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND IT WAS ERROR FOR THE 
COURT NOT TO GRANT A MOTION TO DISMISS OR TO REQUIRE 
THE CITY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE APPELLANT HAD NOT 
BEEN SELECTIVELY PROSECUTED 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss on the basis of selective prosecution. Defendant avers that 
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the established the burden of a prima facie case of selective prosecution, which, 
when established, would shift the burden of disproving the claim to the city. 
However, the court did not find that a prima facie case had been met, and did 
not require the city to disprove the claim, but merely denied the motion. While 
this question could be a mixed question of law and fact, the facts related to the 
sufficiency of the prima facie case, whether the trial court correctly applied the 
law is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness, State v. Harmon, 
910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (UT 1995). 
While prosecutors are generally "given broad discretion in determining 
whether to prosecute, State v. Geer, 765 P.2d l(Utah App. 1988) citing Wayte 
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 
(1985), there is a limit to how broad that discretion can be. 
The decision to prosecute "may not be based on an arbitrary 
classification such as race or religion," U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), 
citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456. Likewise, a decision to prosecute 
cannot be based on any other arbitrary classification such as gender, or marital 
status. 
In order to be successful in his claim of selective prosecution, it is the 
Defendant's burden to establish a prima facie case, which, when established, 
would shift the burden of disproving the claim to the City. The Defense must 
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demonstrate that a prosecutorial policy results in a discriminatory effect, based 
on an unlawful classification, Geer at 3, citing Wayte, U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 
1531. 
Geer discusses the elements of a prima facie case as set out in Castaneda 
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280, 51 L.Ed. 498 (1977). 
The establishment of a prima facie case requires the Defendant to identify the 
group to which he belongs and then to demonstrate "that the identified group 
was treated disparately under the laws as written or applied,'5 Geer at 3, citing 
Castaneda at 495. Geer held that although selective prosecution claims are 
assessed according to "ordinary equal protection standards," the decision to 
prosecute may not be "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such 
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 
S.Ct. at 1531. Geer set out the elements of a prima facie case under an equal 
protection claim as discussed in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494—95, 
97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). In Castaneda, the defendant 
claimed that the Texas grand jury selection process resulted in a 
disproportionately low number of Mexican-Americans serving on such juries. 
The United States Supreme Court found that a prima facie case had been made 
by the defendant, thus requiring the State to rebut the defendant's showing of 
discrimination. The prima facie case consisted of identifying the group to 
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which the defendant belonged and demonstrating that the identified group was 
treated disparately under the laws as written or applied. Id. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 
1280. In the context of selective prosecution claims, in order to establish a 
prima facie case, thus shifting the burden to the State, the defendant must 
demonstrate that a prosecutorial policy results in a discriminatory effect, based 
on an unlawful classification. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 1531. 
The Defendants in this matter are Hispanic males. They have both 
been subjected to numerous and repeated criminal charges by the police to the 
point where they believe they are subjects of harassment. Both the Defendants 
James Luis Gedo and his co-defendant, Miguel David Gedo, have had 
numerous cases against them dismissed when it has been demonstrated that 
they had been subjected to unlawful search and seizure. At the hearing in his 
matter, Counsel for the Appellant proffered testimony that he and his brother 
are frequently stopped and questioned in a harassing way by police officers, 
that in most instances, police reports of these stops are not made, but that in the 
last five years, to which the Appellant was permitted discovery, that more than 
fifty incident reports exist. Of these, only a handful have resulted in actual 
charges being filed. 
Appellant's Co-Appellant, James Gedo, has sustained injuries in half of 
any instance in which he has been charged. In fact, on numerous occasions the 
24 
Gedo brothers have been told by police officers that they should leave the state; 
that they should go back to the country they came from, or asked by officers 
why they have not left. 
Appellant argues that these facts were sufficient to raise a prima facie 
case of selective prosecution. The Defendant belongs to a protected class and 
is being singled out for prosecution because of his status in those protected 
classes and because he continues to aggravate police by refusing to leave the 
jurisdiction, and continuing to exist. He is viewed by police officers as "not 
belonging here" because of the fact that he is Hispanic and considered an 
Hispanic troublemaker. The charges which set off incidents between the police 
and the Appellant and his Co-Appellant are always minor ones, incidents like 
this one involving something as minor as an expired registration, but which 
seem to always result in charges of Disorderly Conduct, and Interference with 
an Arresting Officer. Therefore, Appellant has demonstrated that there is a 
prosecutorial policy to prosecute him and his brother, and a police policy to 
stop and harass him, which results in a discriminatory effect, based on an 
unlawful classification, their race and national origin. Appellant has no 
information, other than anecdotal evidence of discrimination occurring to 
others, except for his own experience. By his own experience, he clearly can 
set out a pattern of police harassment and selective prosecution of himself and 
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his brother. By having raised the issue of selective prosecution, it should have 
become the prosecution's responsibility to disprove it, which they could 
attempted to do by providing statistics of persons charged with criminal 
charges in the City, the race of those who have been charged, when violence is 
used, or when charges include interference with an arresting officer, how often 
this occurs with minority races, or with the Hispanic race, and whether this is 
disproportional considering the population of Provo City. 
However, the City was not required to disprove the charge. While they 
did respond to the Defendant's motion, they made only a fleeting response to 
the allegation, stating, "he has not shown how his race or religion in any way 
comes to play in this case," and that the "reason the defendant has been 
'subjected to numerous and repeated criminal charges' is because he has 
repeatedly been involved in or perpetrated actions in violation of the law. In an 
attempt to make out a prima facie case of selective prosecution, the defendant 
cites a list of cases against him that have been dismissed. However, there are a 
large number of cases that have been successfully prosecuted. If the defendant 
continues to break the law, the City will continue to prosecute him," (p. 9 
Provo City's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss/Suppress). 
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In United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), the Supreme Court 
defined the showing necessary for a defendant to obtain discovery on a 
selective prosecution claim. Id. at 465. To obtain discovery on this claim, the 
Defendants would have needed to present "some evidence tending to show the 
existence of the essential elements" of discriminatory effect and discriminatory 
intent," Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468-69). 
The requirement to show "some evidence" is not a great one. Yet 
Defendants set out a long list of dismissed cases several of which had been 
dismissed by the court on constitutional grounds, demonstrating that the 
Defendants have not been convicted as frequently as charges have been 
dismissed, as well as proffering evidence regarding the seizure of some fifteen 
vehicles less than a month after this incident, proffering testimony of at least 
fifty incidents in the last five years resulting in reports being filed, other 
incidents where the Defendant and/or his brother have been stopped and 
questioned when no incident reports are generated, proffering testimony that 
several police officers have harassed the defendants and asked them why they 
have not yet left the state and why they don't go back to where they came 
from, intimating that they don't belong in this country. Certainly this is "some 
evidence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent," Armstrong, 517 
U.S. at 468-69). 
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The court did not find that a prima facie case of selective prosecution 
had been brought, and therefore did not require the second step, that the 
Prosecution take the burden of refuting this allegation. Because the facts have 
been set out, this Court can review them as a matter of law, and consider 
whether the facts raised by the Appellant are sufficient as a matter of law to 
show a prima facie case of selective prosecution, if the court finds that it is, this 
Court should remand the case to the lower court for the City to bear the burden 
that they do not have a unlawful policy of discriminating against Hispanics. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant asks this Court to reverse his 
convictions for Disorderly Conduct, an Infraction; Reckless Driving a Class B 
Misdemeanor, and Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B 
misdemeanor. If the court finds that the Appellant has made a prima facie case 
of selective prosecution, this Court should remand the case to the lower court 
for the City to bear the burden to prove that they do not have a unlawful policy 
of discriminating against Hispanics. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMI th , this 27m day of February, 2006. 
.aura H. Cabanilla 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Provo City Attorney's Office, 351 West 
Center, P.O. Box 1849, Provo, Utah 84603 this 27th day of February, 2006. 
Laura H. Cabanilla 
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ADDENDA 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-401 
76-2-401. Justification as defense — When allowed. 
(1) Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense 
based on the conduct. The defense of justification may be claimed: 
(a) when the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or property under the 
circumstances described in Sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of this part; 
(b) when the actor's conduct is reasonable and in fulfillment of his duties as 
a governmental officer or employee; 
(c) when the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of minors by parents, 
guardians, teachers, or other persons in loco parentis, as limited by Subsection 
(2); 
(d) when the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of persons in custody 
under the laws of the state; or 
(e) when the actor's conduct is justified for any other reason under the laws 
of this state. 
(2) The defense of justification under Subsection (l)(c) is not available if 
the offense charged involves causing serious bodily injury, as defined in 
Section 76-1-601, serious physical injury, as defined in Section 76-5-109, or 
the death of the minor. 
Amended by Chapter 126, 2000 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-406 
76-2-406. Force in defense of property. 
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another 
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or personal 
property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) Lawfully in the possession of a member of his immediate family; or 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-102 Peace officer authorized to move 
vehicle 
(l)If a peace officer finds a vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-101, 
the officer may move the vehicle, cause the vehicle to be moved, 
or require the driver or other person responsible for the vehicle to 
move the vehicle to safe position of f the highway 
(2) A peace officer may remove or cause to be removed to a place of 
safety any unattended vehicle left standing upon any highway in 
violation of this article or in a position or under circumstances that 
the vehicle obstructs the normal movement of traffic. 
(3) In accordance with Section 41-6-102.5, a peace officer may 
remove or cause to be removed to the nearest garage or other 
place of safety any vehicle found upon a highway when: 
(a) the vehicle has been reported stolen or taken without the 
consent of its owner; 
(b)the person responsible for the vehicle is unable to provide for 
its custody or removal; or 
(c) the person operating the vehicle is arrested for an alleged 
offense for which the peace officer is required by law to take 
the person arrested before a proper magistrate without 
unnecessary delay. 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-la-1101. Seizure — Circumstances where 
permitted — Impound lot standards. 
(1) The division or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take 
possession of any vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor: 
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(a) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe has been 
stolen; 
(b) on which any identification number has been defaced, altered, or 
obliterated; 
(c) that has been abandoned in accordance with Section 41-6a-1408; 
(d) for which the applicant has written a check for registration or title fees 
that has not been honored by the applicant's bank and that is not paid within 30 
days; 
(e) that is placed on the water with improper registration; or 
(f) that is being operated on a highway: 
(i) with registration that has been expired for more than three months; 
(ii) having never been properly registered by the current owner; or 
(iii) with registration that is suspended or revoked. 
(2) If necessary for the transportation of a seized vessel, the vessel's trailer 
may be seized to transport and store the vessel. 
(3) Any peace officer seizing or taking possession of a vehicle, vessel, or 
outboard motor under this section shall comply with the provisions of Section 
41-6a-1406. 
(4) (a) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the commission shall make rules setting standards for public 
garages, impound lots, and impound yards that may be used by peace officers 
and the division. 
(b) The standards shall be equitable, reasonable, and unrestrictive as to the 
number of public garages, impound lots, or impound yards per geographical 
area. 
(5) (a) Except as provided under Subsection (5)(b), a person may not 
operate or allow to be operated a vehicle stored in a public garage, impound 
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lot, or impound yard regulated under this part without prior written permission 
of the owner of the vehicle. 
(b) Incidental and necessary operation of a vehicle to move the vehicle 
from one parking space to another within the facility and that is necessary for 
the normal management of the facility is not prohibited under this Subsection 
(5)(a). 
(6) A person who violates the provisions of Subsection (5) is guilty of a 
class C misdemeanor. 
(7) The division or the peace officer who seizes a vehicle shall record the 
mileage shown on the vehicle's odometer at the time of seizure, if: 
(a) the vehicle is equipped with an odometer; and 
(b) the odometer reading is accessible to the division or the peace officer. 
Amended by Chapter 2, 2005 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 56, 2005 General Session 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
4th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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